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SYNOPSIS: 
Cognitive theory encompasses mental activities such as the observation of different 
stimuli in an environment; the memorization and recall of information; pattern recognition and 
problem representation; and complex activities like social judgments, analytic reasoning, and 
learning.  Cognitive psychology also highlights the constraints that prevent individuals from 
acting as utility-maximizing, fully rational decision-makers.  These constraints lead people to 
rely on a regularly occurring set of cognitive mechanisms to simplify the decision-making 
process.  
Scholars of foreign policy have drawn from several prominent areas of cognitive 
psychology to inform their research.  One such area looks at the beliefs and belief systems that 
are the building blocks for most judgments.  Researchers have also examined how actors use 
cognitive biases and heuristics to cope with uncertainty, which is abundant in foreign policy 
settings.  An important set of cognitive mechanisms examined in foreign policy analysis (FPA) 
relates to judgments about policy risks and costs.  Factors which facilitate and inhibit learning 
are crucial for understanding the conditions under which such judgments may improve over time.  
No cognitive process operates in a vacuum, but instead are moderated by an individual’s group 
context and emotions. 
There are several challenges in applying cognitive theory to FPA.  Such theories are 
biased toward populations that are western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic. They 
are usually first tested using controlled experiments that measure group-level differences, 
whereas FPA scholars are often interested in the cognitive processes of individual leaders 
operating in chaotic environments.  Individual-level psychological mechanisms may augment or 
offset one another, as well as interact with variables at the governmental, societal, and 
international levels of analysis in unpredictable ways.  In light of these challenges, FPA scholars 
who employ cognitive psychology may wish to conceive of their enterprise as a “historical 
science” rather than a predictive one. 
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Cognitive theory focuses on how individuals and small groups engage in decision-
making processes.  Hudson (2005, p. 10) goes so far as to assert that “It is in the cognition and 
information processing of an actual human agent that all the explanatory levels of FPA [foreign 
policy analysis] are in reality integrated.”  This chapter outlines the core features of cognitive 
theory, as well as some important caveats about using this body of theory to explain foreign 
policy behavior. Much of it is devoted to the discussion of major research streams within 
cognitive FPA, though as a general overview it cannot provide an exhaustive summary of any of 
the expansive areas of cognitively-oriented research. The main purpose of the chapter is to 
critically assess several issues associated with an emphasis on human cognition as an 
explanatory framework for political decision-making.  It concludes by discussing methodological 
confounders that can complicate the application of cognitive theory to FPA. 
 
Defining Characteristics of Cognitive Approaches 
 Theories of cognition are concerned with how people attend to, process, store, and recall 
information (Simon 1985, p. 295).  Seminal works by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962), Sprout 
and Sprout (1965), and Kelman (1965) departed from Freudian psychoanalytic theories of 
foreign policy that emphasized unconscious drives as motivations for behavior (Lasswell, 1930; 
George and George, 1956).  Attempts to apply psychoanalysis to foreign policymakers often 
featured imprecisely formulated theories and considered certain policies to be irrational a priori, 
making it difficult to derive testable hypotheses or generalize beyond the particular individuals 
being studied. Conversely, researchers in cognitive psychology typically ascribe to positivist 
theory and aspire to use scientific methods to derive law-like, falsifiable, general theories of 
human decision-making.   
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Cognitive approaches to FPA usually assume that people are procedurally rational, but 
there are clear divergences between this “bounded” rationality and the “substantive” variety 
(March, 1978; Simon, 1972; Simon, 1985, p. 294).  Substantive rational-choice approaches 
assume that decision-makers have stable, ordered preferences; use all relevant and available 
information; carefully weigh the probability of different events and the utility of all possible 
outcomes; and update their beliefs in a systematic fashion when presented with new evidence to 
arrive at an optimal decision (Lau and Levy, 1998, p. 30). Conversely, procedural rationality 
presumes that limited cognitive capacities that prevent people from processing information, 
weighing probabilities, fully specifying available policy options, and learning from events in an 
optimal manner.  Individuals do the best they can to make policy choices given these constraints, 
but they rarely maximize utility when making decisions.  Instead decision-makers satisfice, 
meaning they choose policies judged to be “good enough” even if further analysis of a problem 
could lead them to a policy of greater value (Hafner-Burton, Hughes, and Victor, 2013, pp. 370, 
372; Mintz, 2007, p. 158; Rosati, 2000, pp. 50, 52-53).  It is possible for decision-makers to 
overcome some cognitive constraints by exerting more mental effort.  However, they also face 
physical constraints, such as the limited amount of information humans can store in their 
working memory at any given time.   
Another theme of cognitive theory is that individuals seek to maintain consistency and 
avoid the dissonance that arises when different beliefs conflict with one another (Festinger, 
1957).  The mind processes information in such a way that it creates the impression of an ordered 
reality, instead of what William James (1981 [1890], p. 462) called the “blooming, buzzing 
confusion” stemming from the complexity of the stimuli present in individuals’ social and 
natural environments (similarly see Goldgeier and Tetlock, 2001, p. 83; Rosati, 2000, p. 52).  
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People impose structured narrative accounts on events that may be more accurately described as 
random or haphazard (Hammack and Pilecki, 2012; Patterson and Monroe, 1998).  Individuals 
are thus prone to attend to information that they expect or are primed to see, effectively 
confirming their pre-existing beliefs while neglecting or discounting discrepant information 
(Jevis, 1976, ch. 4; Vertzberger, 1990, ch. 3).   
Hudson (2005, p. 3) is largely correct in her assertion that FPA is “profoundly actor-
specific,” meaning that different leaders are likely to choose divergent policies even when faced 
with similar problems and scenarios (Byman and Pollack, 2001; Hermann, Preston, Korany, and 
Shaw, 2001; Jervis, 2013). It is true that cognitive processes and personality traits will vary 
throughout a population. However, cognitive theory typically assumes that psychological traits 
will be distributed such that, on average, one can expect certain mental processes to be 
characteristic of most individuals.  Cognitive research has found that “people select information 
about alternatives and combine it into choices in systematic ways” that are “predictable” (Lau 
and Levy, 1998, p. 31), which contributes to an emphasis on actor-generality. Nevertheless, most 
psychology studies involve participants from WEIRD states: countries that are Western, 
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic.  Furthermore, individuals from the United States 
make up a disproportionate number of participants in psychology experiments and FPA studies, 
and may be outliers even amongst their WEIRD counterparts (Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan, 
2010; Hermann, 2001, p. 49; Rosati, 2000, p. 71).
1
  This hinders the use of cognitive theory to 
generalize about foreign policy decisions and behavior. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Thus, when this chapter states something like “people generally…” one should presume such statements 
are based largely on studies of the cognition of WEIRD people. 
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Major Areas of Cognitive FPA 
 Cognitively-oriented researchers doing FPA have made contributions to many areas of 
the field (Mintz, 2007, p. 160).  Of these, five are addressed here.  The first is research into how 
foreign policy decision-makers think of themselves, others, and the practice of politics.  The 
second involves studies of cognitive biases and heuristics that affect how political actors reason 
about information.  The most prominent work in this area, addressed in the third section, has 
been research into how decision-makers calculate the expected risks, costs, and benefits of their 
policy actions.  Fourth is research into whether and how policymakers learn.  Lastly, the chapter 
examines how group context and emotion can moderate cognitive processes. 
 
Beliefs, Identities, and Images 
 Beliefs are persistent ideas an actor holds describing the way the world works (causal 
beliefs) as well as what constitutes appropriate or legitimate conduct (normative beliefs; Jervis 
2006, pp. 642-643).  Along with affect and behavior, they are a component attitudes, or 
evaluations of “a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly and Chaiken, 
1993, p. 1). They are less broad than values, which act as general guides that are less context-
specific than beliefs or attitudes (Rokeach, 1973). Belief systems, or the associated term 
“cognitive maps,” are cognitive structures that detail the causal and normative relations between 
different concepts that constitute beliefs, with those of primary importance to a decision-making 
context being invoked more frequently than connected but peripheral beliefs (Axelrod, 1976; 
Larson, 1994, p. 20).   
 A prominent area of FPA is research on leaders’ beliefs in the form of “operational 
codes” (Leites, 1951; George, 1969).  Stressing policymakers’ cognitive limitations, George 
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hypothesized that leaders regularly drew from a set of five “instrumental” and five 
“philosophical” beliefs in order to simplify the decision-making process, establish policy 
options, and choose amongst them.  Instrumental beliefs specify “ends-means relationships,” or 
causal mechanisms a policymaker thinks link decisions, actions, and outcomes.  Alternatively, 
philosophical beliefs establish a decision-maker’s views on the “fundamental nature of politics,” 
such as whether it is primarily characterized by conflict or cooperation (George, 1969, pp. 199-
200).  Both types of beliefs are stable, though they can change as leaders learn from experience 
(George, 1969, pp. 216-220; Renshon, 2008). 
 Operational code theory does not hold that the limited set of beliefs George detailed 
constitute the whole of policymakers’ ideas about the political realm.  Indeed, among many 
possible examples, other scholars have detailed beliefs about whether threats typically arise from 
other countries’ foreign policies or domestic institutions (Saunders, 2011); whether leaders’ 
beliefs about domestic policy are associated with those concerning foreign policy (Rathbun, 
2007); and the effects of military experience on leaders’ beliefs and policies regarding the use of 
force (Horowitz and Stam, 2014).  Furthermore, there is considerable variation across different 
leaders in terms of their instrumental and philosophical beliefs, and in that regard operational 
code theory recognizes a degree of actor-specificity.  However, operational code research also 
assumes that the same ten instrumental and philosophical categories are central and applicable to 
numerous leaders’ belief systems (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998, p. 176), even though 
beliefs within these categories vary from person to person. 
 Computer-assisted content analysis of policymakers’ speeches and other communications 
enables researchers to analyze a large amount of data and maximize inter-coder reliability and 
content validity (Schafer, 2000; Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998). Quantitative measurements 
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of different beliefs can be used as variables in statistical models to estimate the effects of his or 
her beliefs on the propensity to use force, apply sanctions, and so forth (Schafer and Walker, 
2006). This approach does not account for contextual specificity, or the possibility that the same 
words may have different meanings across time and space (Adcock and Coller, 2001, pp. 534-
536). Even though Leites (1951) developed the operational code to analyze beliefs of Soviet 
leaders, its developmental trajectory leaves its validity beyond the WEIRD context in a state of 
greater uncertainty. 
 Closely related to beliefs are individuals’ images of those outside their own political 
communities, and how these affect people’s conceptions of themselves and their social groups.  
Images are cognitive schemata, which like belief systems consist of a person’s “interrelated 
knowledge about a concept or stimulus” and are structured hierarchically from general to more 
specific (Larson, 1994, pp. 19-20).  For example, one may possess an image of “dictators” 
characterized by linked characteristics (authoritarian, aggressive, etc.) into which specific 
leaders, such as Adolf Hitler, fit.  As with beliefs, images are simplified versions of their 
referents.  Racial stereotypes are a well-known type of prejudicial image that can also affect 
foreign policy decisions (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002).  
Images are in part produced and sustained by an individual’s cultural milieu (Bar-Tal and 
Teichman, 2005; Jahoda, 1999).  They are also affected by individual-level psychological 
mechanisms.  For example, if there are multiple possible images of another political community, 
as will typically be the case, people’s need for self-esteem may lead them to adopt a less 
flattering image of the outgroup to highlight their own perceived superiority (Herrmann, 1985, p. 
672).  Attribution theory indicates that political leaders will ascribe adversaries’ and allies’ 
undesirable actions to the latter groups’ own inherent resoluteness or lack thereof, respectively.  
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This has significant implications for the importance of reputation for resolve, a subset of leaders’ 
overall images of other states, in international politics (Mercer, 1995).   
Given the massive stakes of international conflict in the nuclear era and the potential 
consequences of misperception during crises, Cold War-era researchers intensely examined 
Soviet and U.S. leaders’ images of one another (Herrmann, 1985; 1986; Holsti, 1962).  In 
general, members of WEIRD societies are biased toward attributing other people’s actions to 
their personal traits rather than situational pressures, a predisposition called the fundamental 
attribution error (Ross, 1977).  This can give rise to or reinforce images of other individuals’ 
perceived groups, as well as reinforce dangerous patterns of international relations.  For instance, 
if state leaders are more likely to attribute one another’s decisions on military spending as signs 
of an innately hostile character rather than systemic pressures to defend their country, this will 
exacerbate the security dilemma (Glaser, 1997, p. 182).  
Jervis (1970) notes that the images adversaries project at one another, and the inferences 
opponents draw as a result, are crucial for understanding conflict dynamics.  State leaders trying 
to estimate whether their opponent has defensive or aggressive intentions must evaluate whether 
or not their adversary’s words and actions decidedly place them in one of these two categories.  
Information that allows a decision-maker to differentiate opponents along these lines may be a 
“costly signal” (Schelling, 1966, p. 150) in that certain images are too costly to project unless the 
sender is sincere—otherwise the cost of sending the signal would outweigh the gains sought.  
However, variations in individuals’ prior expectations and images of an adversary will lead 
different actors to draw dissimilar conclusions about an action’s meaning. Even if one side 
makes a statement it considers “cheap talk,” in that they do not believe it will affect their 
opponent’s perception of them, leaders on the other side may significantly change their estimates 
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of the adversary (Hall and Yarhi-Milo, 2012; Mercer, 2013; Yarhi-Milo, 2014).   
Per constructivist International Relations (IR) theory, images can be co-constitutive 
(Wendt, 1998), meaning the structure of one’s schema of the “other” is fundamental for 
understanding oneself and vice versa. This perspective is most prominent within cognitive FPA 
on role theory.  Roles are relational identities.  For example, it makes no sense to see one’s state 
as “leader of the free world” if one has no image of what the “followers” in the “free world” are 
like.  Holsti (1970) argued that countries had numerous “national role conceptions” that 
described these ideas of self and other. Along with scripts for behavior, roles can also define 
where one stands in the international hierarchy.  The behavioral scripts and status-conscious 
dimensions of roles combine to inform foreign policy choices.  For instance, if state leaders 
adopt a hostile, oppositional role conception while simultaneously believing their country has not 
risen to its proper station in international politics, they may be more apt to pursue nuclear 
weapons than a comparable country in which satisfied and non-oppositional role conceptions 
nevertheless predominate (Hymans, 2006).  
The question of which image or role will be salient at any given moment is not a minor 
one.  Holsti (1970, p. 260) identified 17 different national role conceptions, which other 
researchers elaborated upon and extended (Walker, 1987; Le Prestre, 1997).  In cases where a 
multitude of images and identities are available, outside factors must be incorporated into the 
theoretical framework to predict which will rise to the fore.  Institutional context and 
bureaucratic politics may be especially important in determining the officials who constitute the 
“ultimate decision-making unit” (Hermann and Hermann, 1989) and thus which role conceptions 
and images they favor. Research from the field of American Politics demonstrates that threat 
perceptions are likely to make negative images of outgroups particularly salient (Marcus, 
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Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, and Wood, 1995).  If people fear for their own survival they are also 
likely to reject novel roles, instead being drawn to those highlighting traditional behaviors, 
beliefs, and values (Greenberg, Solomon, and Pyszczynski, 1997). 
 
Heuristics  
 Beliefs, images, and roles, which are themselves simplified representations of reality, 
may in turn be produced by cognitive processes that are simpler than those involved in 
substantively rational decision-making.  These processes are forms of heuristic reasoning, or 
mental shortcuts. Heuristics privilege certain types of information over others to make 
evaluations or determine a course of action, even if the excluded information is relevant to the 
decision in question. Kahneman and Tversky (1974) documented numerous cognitive heuristics 
people use when faced with uncertainty.  Someone using the representativeness heuristic, for 
instance, attends to stereotypical characteristics of an entity in order to judge the probability it 
belongs to a certain category.  Say someone is asked the probability that a political leader is a 
dictator versus the probability that leader is a dictator and a communist. A person reliant on the 
representativeness heuristic whose stereotypical image of a dictator is a communist like Mao, 
rather than a right-wing dictator like Pinochet, would say the latter probability is higher.  This 
would be an incorrect answer, but because most people are unfamiliar with the rules of 
conditional probabilities, it is simpler to use the heuristic to arrive at a conclusion. 
Heuristics are a biased form of information processing, used because a full assessment of 
all relevant evidence in a decision-making context is often beyond a person’s cognitive 
capacities.  Heuristics are more likely to be used if there is very little time to make a decision, or 
multiple problems must be addressed simultaneously (Rieskamp and Hoffrage, 2008; Sweller, 
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1988). Nevertheless, heuristic reasoning can approximate substantive rationality, especially for 
experts who can base decisions on patterns they recognize from past experiences.  Even if a 
chess grandmaster cannot calculate all possible moves given the position of pieces on the board, 
she may recall numerous games in which the configuration of pieces resembled that of the 
current match and accordingly outline a non-exhaustive set of effective strategies.  Likewise, 
though political experts may not do well at predicting international events or learning from past 
errors (Tetlock, 2005), they do appear better able than non-experts to use heuristics to prioritize 
information when addressing specific problems, which also serves to streamline the advisory 
process and allows officials to reach decisions in a more efficient manner (Hafner-Burton et al., 
2013; Hermann, 1986; Saunders, forthcoming). 
The poliheuristic model (Mintz and Geva, 1997) tries to account for a multiplicity of 
mental shortcuts decision-makers use, and has been applied to a wide array of foreign policy 
issues (Mintz, 2004, pp. 4-6).  Each option for dealing with a foreign policy problem can be 
evaluated along multiple dimensions: military feasibility, economic consequences, likelihood of 
public support, and so on.  The poliheurstic model theorizes a two-step decision process that 
begins with an individual eliminating certain options in a non-compensatory manner.  This 
means that, rather than engaging in a substantively rational cost-benefit analysis of each option 
in which a weakness along one dimension can be compensated for by strengths associated with 
another (e.g. option A has high military costs but will likely receive popular support), 
weaknesses along a particularly salient dimension of a policy option might not be offset by 
strengths of the option’s other dimensions no matter how great they are.2  As an example, 
Farnham (2000) argues that President Franklin Roosevelt judged foreign policies primarily by 
                                                          
2
 Because people satisfice, the order in which alternative policies are presented also matters.  An option that 
is minimally satisfactory along all critical dimensions is likely to be retained for further evaluation if presented first, 
but might not if it is preceded by several other options that are similar or even slightly worse.   
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whether he could secure public support for them.  If he did not believe support would be 
forthcoming, he would not consider the option or its other attendant dimensions any further.  In 
fact, the most common cognitive shortcut is to evaluate whether or not an action will damage a 
policymaker’s own political fortunes (Mintz, 2004, p. 7).  Once a policymaker has simplified the 
decision-making process by limiting the number of acceptable choices, the remaining ones are 
evaluated in a more substantively rational manner.   
Poliheuristic theory has been criticized for not explaining how political actors define 
foreign policy issues as “problems” that must be addressed;3 over-emphasizing the salience of 
political considerations compared to other policy dimensions; and neglecting the institutional 
context in which decisions are made (Stern, 2004, pp. 110-111).  Poliheuristic theory has been 
applied to leaders in the Middle East and South Asia as well as FPA’s typical emphasis on the 
decisions of U.S. politicians (Mintz, 2004, p. 6), which somewhat deflects the critique regarding 
the neglect of institutional context and avoids generalizations based solely on WEIRD states.  
Another criticism of the poliheuristic theory is its assumption that rational actors are risk averse. 
In the second stage of the model, decision-makers are presumed to rationally select the policy 
option that “maximiz[es] benefits and minimiz[es] risks” (Mintz, 2004, pp. 6-7). However, a 
tendency to take big gambles when making decisions is not necessarily irrational, but may 
simply be considered a preference like any other.  Furthermore, research using other cognitive 
models has shown that an individual’s preference for risk is often contingent on the situation and 
the type of heuristics they employ, a subject to which the chapter now turns. 
 
Risk, Loss, and Overconfidence 
 Risk is formally defined as the variance of outcome values in a probability distribution, 
                                                          
3
 On problem representation in foreign policy, see Sylvan and Voss (1998). 
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such that policy options become riskier as the range of their possible outcomes increases. The 
common understanding of the term simply associates risk with the potential for bad outcomes.  
What is more, there will often be a difference between the real risks involved in a policy scenario 
and the risks decision-makers perceive, which will be a function not only of the variance and 
magnitude of potential outcomes, but also the amount of confidence individuals have in the 
information upon which their decisions are based (Vertzberger, 1998).  Despite findings that 
indicate political actors would normally be risk averse (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and 
Vohs, 2001), instances in which decision-makers have been overconfident have also been 
thoroughly studied by FPA scholars.  Heuristics can be a source of unjustified optimism. 
 Prospect theory details how individuals become more willing to take risks when in the 
“domain” of loss, and more cautious when in the domain of gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979b; McDermott, 1998; Mercer, 2005).  This is true even when logically equivalent scenarios 
are framed differently to make losses more salient than gains or vice versa.  The best known 
example of this is Kahneman and Tversky’s (1984) experiment in which participants were given 
a choice of two policies to address a hypothetical outbreak of disease.  Some participants were 
told that if they chose Policy A, 400 of 600 sick people would die, whereas if they chose Policy 
B there was a one-third chance all 600 people would be saved and a two-thirds chance no one 
would be saved. Other participants were told Policy A would kill 200 of 600 people; the 
probabilities attached to the different outcomes possible under Policy B remained the same.  
Policies A and B have the same expected results, but Policy B is the riskier option as probability 
comes into play.
4
  Risky Policy B was preferred by a majority of people when Policy A was 
                                                          
4
 Prospect theory also details how people’s evaluations of probabilities vary depending on how great or 
small they are.  Individuals tend to overweight small probabilities as well as very high probabilities, such that 
changes in probabilities near 0 or 1 have a larger impact on people’s preferences for risk than do mid-range 
probabilities (Levy, 1992, p. 178). 
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framed as producing a loss (killing 200 people instead of saving 400), but the certainty of Policy 
A was preferred when it was framed as a gain (saving 400 instead of killing 200).   
 Prospect theory has numerous implications for FPA scholars.  Among these, leaders of 
declining powers may be expected to be more risk-acceptant in their decision-making than 
leaders of rising states.  Deterrence should also be easier than compellence: the former requires a 
challenger to forgo a gain, whereas the latter requires states to accept a loss.  However, one 
difficulty in applying prospect theory to foreign policy is that whether a political actor is in a 
domain of gain or loss depends on their “reference point” (Levy, 1992, pp. 176-177).  Consider 
the hypothetical leader of a state that lost a piece of territory years ago.  If the leader’s reference 
point is the time period prior to this loss, prospect theory would expect him to be risk-acceptant 
and take aggressive action to retake the former possession.  However, if the leader’s reference 
point is the present, it is more plausible that he would be risk-averse, as acquiring the territory 
would represent a gain over the status quo.  Whereas psychologists can establish participants’ 
reference point during an experiment, the same cannot be said for FPA scholars studying 
historical cases of political decision-making. 
 A related challenge for prospect theory is that the theory acknowledges that one’s 
reference point may lie in the present, past, or future, but does not take into account how that 
point’s temporal distance from the present matters (Krebs and Rapport, 2012).  Studies have 
shown that people do not discount losses or gains at a constant rate.  Instead, both—but 
especially gains—lose their subjective value more rapidly than standard discounted utility theory 
would expect as they become further removed from the present.  Conversely, as losses and gains 
become quite temporally distant, they virtually cease declining in subjective value.  This 
“hyperbolic” form of discounting, where values decline rapidly in the near-term and then plateau 
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in the long-term, can lead to irrational reversals of policy preferences and make cooperation 
between states harder to achieve than rational-institutionalist models of IR would suggest 
(Streich and Levy, 2007).   
When future losses and gains are probabilistic rather than certain, as is usually the case in 
international politics, individuals tend to be overconfident in their plans to secure goals in the 
more distant future in comparison to those meant to accomplish day-to-day tasks (Johnson, 2004, 
pp. 41, 237). To effectively assess one’s future plans, it is necessary to evaluate both the 
probability of a plan’s success and the magnitude of the benefits sought (or losses avoided).  
However, the further in the future one expects to achieve a goal and execute part or all of one’s 
plan, the harder it is to envision the contextual features that will affect the probability of its 
success.  One might think this would lead to pessimism, but Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979a) 
study of the “planning fallacy” found the opposite: temporal distance usually led people to 
underestimate the costs of attaining their goals or completing a task, even if they had experienced 
difficulty with similar tasks in the past.  According to construal level theory (Trope and 
Liberman, 2003), this is because people employ a heuristic when evaluating long-term plans.  
Instead of exerting cognitive energy assessing their plan’s feasibility, they simplify their 
assessments by concentrating on the desirability of their goal, which is much less dependent on 
future contextual details.  They thus construe their actions in terms of why they are pursuing 
their high-level goals, rather than how they are going to formulate and execute the concrete steps 
of their plan.  This abstract, high-level focus leads people to neglect or ignore how unexpected 
events and other factors that generate risk could affect their plan’s feasibility.  This has 
implications for how state leaders think about addressing future threats or seizing distant 
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opportunities (Krebs and Rapport, 2012), as well as how they assess combat versus post-conflict 
tasks in war (Rapport, 2015).  
 
Learning and Foreign Policy 
 Learning may be the most complex of all cognitive activities.  It involves the 
categorization of a current event as a puzzle or problem; identification of the fundamental 
features of the problem based on existing beliefs and schemas; retrieval of information regarding 
past events; the organization of that information in such a way that it can be applied to the 
current event; and observation of the effects of one’s own or another’s actions that are then used 
to update causal and/or normative beliefs. Learning is often done “on the fly” through trial-and-
error as an individual executes strategies to solve a puzzle and then adjusts based on the feedback 
they receive, sometimes redefining the problem at hand (Levy, 1994; Stein, 1994; Hermann, 
1990).   
Foreign policy is an especially difficult area in which to learn and apply lessons.  Most 
political problems are “ill-structured” in that they have no single solution (Hermann, 1990, p. 10; 
Levy, 1994, p. 292; Stein, 1994, pp. 172-173). Not only do policymakers typically lack a great 
deal of relevant information, but they may not even be aware of what pieces of information they 
are lacking (those infamous “unknown unknowns”).  The very definition of learning is 
conceptually fraught in that scholars disagree about whether or not it necessarily involves an 
increase in the accuracy and precision of beliefs (Stein, 2002), or simply requires cognitive 
change in response to some external stimuli (Levy, 1994; Reiter, 1996). 
A prominent area of the FPA literature studies how policymakers use historical analogies 
to learn and make decisions.  This as both “causal” and “diagnostic” learning (Levy, 1994, p. 
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285): past experiences inform present estimates of what the outcome of different policy actions 
will be, and are used to identify key features of the current situation. Leaders typically over-
generalize from past events, obscuring differences between historical cases and the ones at hand 
(Khong, 1992; Neustadt and May, 1986; Vertzberger, 1986).  Khong (1992, p. 7) models 
analogous reasoning as AX:BX::AY:BY, meaning that if event A had attribute X and event B also 
has X, a policymaker infers that since A had attribute Y then B also has Y.  For example, Khong 
argues that U.S. officials who subscribed to the “Dien Bien Phu” analogy before the Vietnam 
War reasoned that because French military efforts against the Viet Minh had resulted in 
prolonged fighting and defeat, ongoing U.S. military efforts would also fail.  Alternatively, 
policymakers using the “Munich” analogy (referring to the deal struck with Hitler in 1938) had 
learned that appeasing hostile forces leads to further aggression, with countries falling like 
“dominoes” as the adversary presses its military campaign forward.5 They were thus much more 
in favor of U.S. military action in Vietnam.   
Over-generalization is just one impediment to accurate and efficient learning. Instead of 
neutrally applying evidence to learn about existing theories, people use numerous heuristics and 
rationalizations to sort information (Tetlock, 1999).  Their beliefs thus change more slowly than 
a substantively rational model would expect.
6
  Foremost amongst these heuristics is the 
confirmation bias: people search for and attend to evidence that supports their existing 
worldview rather than that which would challenge it (Nickerson, 1998).  Another inhibitor is the 
hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975).  Once people know the outcome of a case, such as whether a 
given foreign policy succeeded in attaining its goals, they retroactively interpret the evidence 
                                                          
5
 Saying states are dominoes waiting to be toppled is metaphorical reasoning, which is related to the 
analogous form (Shimko, 1994).  
6
 One model of rational learning is based on Bayes Law.  Confidence in a belief  is established by 
accounting for one’s prior confidence in that belief and the likelihood that one would observe a specific outcome 
(such as an adversary behaving more aggressively after being appeased) if the belief was correct. 
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such that the outcome seems virtually inevitable. The hindsight bias can lead those who make 
correct predictions overconfident in the theory underlying their estimates, since they neglect how 
uncertain they were prior to the outcome being observed.  Scholars of covert intelligence keenly 
note how political leaders use hindsight to blame surprise attacks or disappointing policy 
outcomes on intelligence “failures” even if there was no realistic way such events could have 
been predicted (Pillar, 2011, p. 228). 
Scholars have also explored individual-level factors that promote or inhibit learning.  In 
his study of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Etheredge (1985) argued that 
policymakers failed to learn effectively because they typically had a “hardball” personality type.  
Harkening back to psychoanalytic theories, Etheredge contends that hardball politicians’ 
insecurities and their need to demonstrate social dominance led them to resist compromise and 
favor coercive actions designed to undermine leftist governments regardless of the past outcomes 
of such policies.  Twenty years later, Tetlock (2005) highlighted a different aspect of policy 
experts’ personalities, drawing from Isaiah Berlin’s metaphor of “foxes” and “hedgehogs.” 
Foxes rely less on general theories to understand how the world works and instead are open to 
multiple explanations for why any given foreign policy outcome occurred.  As a corollary, they 
are apt to treat each foreign policy problem as unique.  Conversely, hedgehogs deduce likely 
foreign policy outcomes and events from an overarching theory; they know “one big thing” 
which they use to understand the world.  Tetlock’s multi-year study of foreign policy experts’ 
predictions about international events revealed that foxes were considerably better at the task, 
and were more effective at updating their beliefs after mistaken predictions than were hedgehogs.  
These findings support related studies on the association between theories, cognitive complexity, 
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and learning (Hermann and Choi, 2007; Koopman, Snyder, and Jervis, 1990; Suedfeld and 
Tetlock, 1977). 
Along with personality, FPA scholars have emphasized how contextual factors affect the 
learning process.  Drawing from research in neuroscience, Holmes (2013) argues that face-to-
face meetings between diplomats and foreign leaders enable greater learning than less direct 
forms of communication.  Directly observing another’s expressions during talks activates “mirror 
neurons” in the brain which simulate the mental processes of one’s conversation partner.  In 
other words, face-to-face meetings better allow people to understand what their interlocutor is 
thinking.  Communicative expressions that are automatic and involuntary act as “indices”, which 
unlike “signals” are determinative rather than probabilistic indicators of another’s beliefs (Jervis, 
1970).   
Aside from applications of the life sciences to FPA work, social features like 
accountability have been argued to promote learning.  If an individual believes they will face 
significant consequences depending on how well they analyze a problem, they are likely to 
expend more effort searching for relevant information and be more critical when evaluating it 
(Tetlock, 1985).  Stern (1997) asserts that foreign policy crises probably induce greater 
accountability, as a large portion of political leaders’ constituencies will be attentive to how 
policymakers perform when the stakes are high.  At the same time, Stern (1997, p. 77) correctly 
notes that too much stress can inhibit learning, a point made elsewhere (Hammond, 2000; 
Lebovic, 1995, p. 845).  Given this caveat, it is important to distinguish between learning during 
and after a crisis.  During a crisis, decision-makers’ responses to stress may partially cancel out 
the positive effect accountability has on learning.  Afterwards, leaders may have the time to more 
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thoroughly reflect on what lessons they should take away, but depending on the crisis outcome 
may feel less accountable to public scrutiny and unmotivated to evaluate their decisions.  
Accountability may not be an unalloyed good.  If leaders expect their decisions to be 
heavily scrutinized, they may think it is safer for them to agree with whatever consensus appears 
to emerge within a decision-making group.  Such a strategy will diffuse responsibility across 
numerous decision-makers rather than focusing it on an individual whose position stood out from 
the rest, diminishing creativity and willingness to challenge the majority view in the process 
(Meade and Stasavage, 2008). Diffusion of responsibility can in turn lead decision-making 
groups to adopt more extreme positions, since blame for failure will not fall on any particular 
individual.  This will especially be the case in democracies governed by coalitions, as shared 
responsibility will diffuse harm at the ballot box rather than concentrating it on a single party 
(Beasley and Kaarbo, 2014; Kaarbo, 2008, pp. 61-62).   
 
Key Moderators of Cognition: Group Context and Emotion 
These last points highlight the important effects group-level variables and emotions have 
on cognitive processes.  Regarding the former, political decisions are rarely made by a single 
person.  Two of the most influential works to promote the study of psychology in the context of 
political groups were Janis’s (1972) research on “groupthink,” and Allison’s (1971) 
conceptualization of bureaucratic politics.  Both authors focus on episodes of U.S. foreign policy 
crises.  Janis argues that ideologically homogenous groups often prized cohesion and 
concurrence above all else when addressing a problem.  This is especially be the case under 
stressful conditions, such as foreign policy crises, since the perception of unanimity enhances 
each decision-makers’ confidence in their group.  As a corollary, groupthink discourages dissent 
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and leads to poor decision-making: truncated information search and limited articulation of 
policy alternatives; reluctance to revisit earlier decisions or reconsider definitions of the problem; 
the adoption of simplistic, hostile images of outgroups; and so forth.  Alternatively, the 
fundamental cognitive premise of Allison’s model is that “where you stand is where you sit.”  In 
other words, the bureaucratic organizations individuals belong to significantly shape their 
preferences and definitions of the national interest.  According to Allison, the U.S. government 
was not unitary during Cuban Missile Crisis, but rather a collection of competing bureaucratic 
actors bargaining and compromising with one another in order to arrive at a strategy. 
Though still widely cited, both Janis’s and Allison’s models have been thoroughly 
criticized.  Although there has been some empirical support for groupthink’s hypothesized 
effects on foreign policy decisions (Herek, Janis, and Huth, 1987), most of the evidence has been 
mixed or contrary to the model’s expectations (Fuller and Aldag, 1997; Kramer, 1998; Schafer 
and Crichlow, 2010; Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang, and Feld, 1992).  Allison, meanwhile, 
was not wrong to assert that bureaucracies affect individual preferences and the way people 
mentally represent problems.  Organizations and political groups influence what information 
individuals attend to by framing policy issues, systematically highlighting certain features of 
typical problems while obscuring others (Garrison, 2001; Maoz, 1990; Yarhi-Milo, 2014).  By 
defining what counts as “success,” bureaucracies also affect what information their members 
monitor when determining whether or not a policy is effective, as well as the adjustments they 
implement when goals are not being met (Gartner, 1999; Steinbruner, 1974).  Nevertheless, 
Allison’s model of bureaucratic politics has been criticized for its murky definitions of key 
concepts and for drawing conclusions that do not logically follow from its assumptions (Bendor 
and Hammond, 1992; Welch, 1992).   
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 Despite their flaws, these early works provided ground on which other researchers could 
build.   Consistent with groupthink, decision-making groups were observed to engage in “risky 
shifts,” adopting policies that were riskier than any individual group member preferred by 
themselves (Vertzberger, 1984, p. 73). However, continuing research found that groups in fact 
exhibit “polarization,” meaning they adopt policies that are either riskier or more cautious than 
any individual member’s preferences (Kaarbo, 2008, p. 60).  The extremity of outcomes in 
different directions indicates the structure and composition of a group significantly moderates 
policymaking.  It might be tempting to assert that foreign policy groups within democracies 
would be prone to shifts in a more cautious direction, as the multiple institutional checks and 
constituencies to which leaders are responsible would constrain behavior. This hypothesis, 
however, neglects the role that leaders play in group decisions.  Hermann and Kegley (1995) 
posit that moderate leaders in democracies will act pragmatically, showing sensitivity to 
institutional constraints and flexibility in response to incoming information.  Conversely, 
ideologically-driven leaders will aggressively try to circumvent constraints and be less apt to 
modify goals in the light of new evidence.
7
  Schafer and Crichlow (2010) provide qualitative and 
quantitative evidence showing that distrustful leaders are most likely to structure their decision-
making groups so they are closed off from outside sources of information, often leading to higher 
levels of conflict with other states. 
Charles Hermann and colleagues (Hermann, Stein, Sundelius, and Walker, 2001) further 
specify how a leader’s orientation and the composition of the decision-making group interact.  If 
members primarily identify with the decision-making group, as opposed to their bureaucratic 
agencies or other constituencies, and are led by an ideologue, collectively they are likely to 
                                                          
7
 This is consistent with Rathbun (2014), who finds that ideologically extreme leaders in democracies and 
non-democracies are less sensitive to domestic and foreign structural constraints when negotiating.  
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exhibit many symptoms of groupthink. A pragmatic leader who encourages norms of dissent, 
however, can preclude such decision-making pathologies even within a tightly knit group.  If 
members do not primarily identify with the group and require unanimity to arrive at a decision, 
the outcome may be deadlock or compromise depending on whether the leader is able to act as a 
broker.  If a mere plurality of group members is required to adopt a policy, then the degree to 
which the decision reflects the views of the group will depend in part on how much 
encouragement the leader gives to minority preferences. This framework appears to provide 
explanatory leverage beyond the WEIRD domain (Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann, and Hermann, 
2001). 
A commonly prescribed method of avoiding groupthink and polarization is “multiple 
advocacy” within decision-making groups (George, 1972).  Multiple advocacy requires decision-
making groups to be composed of members with diverse preferences and expertise such that no 
one perspective has a pronounced advantage over the others. Ideally all members are equally 
resourced and familiar with the foreign policy problem at hand, and the leader encourages a 
balanced debate within the group (George and Stern, 2002, pp. 491-493).  By pooling expertise 
and affording each member’s view equal representation, multiple advocacy is meant to 
approximate a substantively rational decision-making process.  There are tradeoffs involved in 
such an approach, however.  Multiple advocacy can take a greater than average amount of time 
to execute effectively compared to other processes.   Another potential challenge is that, if the 
group leader is not mindful of encouraging group members to offer distinct perspectives, 
individuals may disproportionately share “common” information—that which was already 
known by most of the group members prior to discussion.  Not only is common information 
often more prevalent than individuals’ unique pieces of information, but people are perceived as 
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more competent and credible when they put forward information that others already know 
(Stasser and Titus, 2003).  During crises, when time is short, people will try to find consensus 
quickly, which will further encourage discussion of common information (Karau and Kelly, 
1992).   
The preceding discussion included observations about the role emotional stress can play 
in cognition.  A wealth of new findings in regards to affect and cognition have cropped up in the 
past two decades, and the Political Science and IR disciplines have increasingly made emotion 
central to their agendas (Hall and Ross, 2015; McDermott, 2004; Mercer, 2010).
8
 Though 
individuals’ emotional states do not always influence their cognitive processing, they are most 
likely to do so when people attend to problems that are complex and atypical (Forgas, 1995), 
which is characteristic of many foreign policy problems and crises.  
One of the primary findings from research on emotion and cognition is that events and 
beliefs generally have an emotional “tinge” attached to them.  Triggering an emotion attached to 
an event will make it more accessible in one’s memory (Hermann and Choi, 2007, pp. 142-143), 
and if the emotional charge of the event is very strong it will be more likely to dominate an 
individual’s decision-making (Stein, 1994, p. 169). Not all emotions affect cognition in the same 
way, however.  People in positive moods are prone to act like hedgehogs, or rely on general 
knowledge structures to make inferences.  Analogies, heuristics, and basic belief systems are all 
examples of this type of cognitive processing. Conversely, negative emotions promote fox-like 
thinking, or the use of inductive, case-specific reasoning.  This may be because people in good 
moods are more confident in relying on familiar general knowledge structures, while people in 
bad moods infer there is something “not right” in their environment and thus are more attentive 
                                                          
8
 Many theorists distinguish between “emotion” and “affect,” but for the sake of brevity both terms are 
treated as equivalent here.  
24 
 
to situation-specific information (Bless, 2000). Relatedly, positive moods facilitate the 
assimilation of incoming information into existing knowledge structures.  Negative moods, on 
the other hand, lead people to see situations as more unique while motivating them to avoid 
judgment errors and retain as much incoming information from the situation as possible (Fiedler, 
2000).   
Though the preceding makes it appear that negative emotions are more conducive to 
learning, it is important to remember that those with foreign policy expertise may be better able 
to utilize general knowledge structures to address problems than novices.  Treating each situation 
as unique may not be particularly efficient.  Furthermore, negative emotions like anxiety can 
either help or inhibit cognition depending on how strongly it is felt.  For instance, people 
generally attend more to feasibility considerations when evaluating plans that will be executed in 
the near future, which guards against overconfidence.  However, if an individual is feeling a 
great deal of stress because a calamitous event like a war appears imminent and unavoidable, 
they may cope with their emotions by entering an “implemental mindset” that spurs them to 
execute plans confidently rather than consider the costs and risks of doing so (Johnson and 
Tierney, 2011).   
 
Conclusion: Methodological Issues and Cognitive FPA as Science 
Despite the diversity of findings in cognitive psychology, this area of study is largely 
agreed on the fundamentals of human information processing.  People are modelled as 
boundedly-rational information processors who satisfice and seek to maintain cognitive 
consistency in the face of a complex environment.  With this basic model as a reference point, 
researchers have used scientific methods to try and establish generalizable theories about how 
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people process and act upon information in different contexts.  It has long been debated whether 
FPA and IR theory should ascribe to this mode of knowledge production, but even if one 
answers in the affirmative there are several methodological caveats to be aware of when applying 
cognitive theory to the study of politics.   
Numerous authors have questioned whether findings in psychology obtained using 
controlled experiments are externally valid—can one infer the cognitive traits of foreign policy 
officials using results from “typical” individuals in an artificial setting (Hafner-Burton et al., 
2013; Lau and Levy, 1998, pp. 40-41; Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz, 2006)?  This problem may be 
further confounded by the alleged “replication crisis” in psychology, in which researchers have 
debated the prevalence of problematic research practices that bring the reliability of a range of 
findings into question (Pashler and Wagenmakers, 2012; Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn, 
2011). In some ways, however, these are secondary issues.  FPA scholars do not simply take it 
for granted that a result obtained in a laboratory will be applicable to research in foreign policy, 
which is important given the WEIRD bias of cognitive psychology. 
 Of greater concern than the question of external validity is the disjuncture between 
testing theories by using experiments versus testing them using evidence generated by particular 
individuals in historical cases.  Psychology experiments looking at average treatment effects, or 
the difference between control and treatment groups used in experiments.  A statistically 
significant difference between groups does not mean that all (or even most) individuals in those 
groups behaved as the theory being tested expects.  For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 
p. 454) note that prospect theory does not apply universally, and more recent work has shown 
that personal attributes such as occupying a position of power can offset the cognitive effects of 
loss (Renshon, 2015). Not only then must researchers pay careful attention to how closely the 
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experimental context approximates the “real world” in which decision-makers evaluate and 
implement foreign policies; they should also expect that a certain number of individuals in their 
case studies will not conform to general psychological findings, even if one assumes the 
replicability of the findings from which the study draws.  Readers should thus be suspicious of 
case studies in which all decision-makers are portrayed as conforming to a particular cognitive 
theory. 
Another important methodological issue of importance is interaction is the variability of 
effect strength.  Even for theories that have been thoroughly replicated via experiments, the 
strength of a treatment effect on decision-making may vary considerably between studies and 
individuals (Krebs and Rapport, 2012, p. 541).  This may partially be due to unidentified 
background conditions that exist even in controlled studies, such as individual characteristics or 
recent events known to most members of a treatment group, which affect how they interpret and 
act upon information provided in an experiment.  Such effects are even harder to account for in 
case studies than in experiments. 
Given that numerous actors may not behave as cognitive theories expect them to in cases 
of foreign policymaking, and that the extent to which actors behave as theories predict will vary 
from case to case and even across time amongst single individuals, should scholars who do 
cognitive FPA using case studies abandon the idea that their findings will be “scientific”?  If one 
defines science as the discovery of law-like regularities explicable by a general theory, than the 
answer may be yes.  However, there are other models of scientific knowledge production 
available. FPA scholars using cognitive theory could consider Elster’s (1998) invocation of 
“causal mechanisms” as an alternative.  Elster (1998, p. 45) defines mechanisms as “frequently 
occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown 
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conditions or with indeterminate consequences.”   He elaborates that controlled experiments can 
reveal which causal factors are sufficient to produce some outcome of interest, but in 
uncontrolled environments like the foreign policy realm it is rare that the causal factors at work 
in the lab are not partially offset or moderated by other events (1998, p. 51). Cognitive 
mechanisms may thus be useful for explaining foreign policy outcomes, though not necessarily 
predicting them. Accepting this premise would encourage cognitively-oriented FPA scholars to 
treat their research as akin to the “historical sciences” like geology and evolutionary biology, 
where the goal of research is to elaborate the process by which different mechanisms interacted 
contingently to produce a specific result (Gaddis, 1996, p. 39). Such a framework would situate 
cognitive work comfortably within the rest of FPA, where case-specific detail is more the norm 
than parsimonious general theory (Hudson, 2005, pp.4-5). 
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